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Facts, Rights and Remedies
By WADlE E. SAID*
The fate of the Palestinian refugees is, in my view, the critical
issue for resolving the conflict in historic Palestine. The refugee
situation is more important than the issue of Jerusalem or, for that
matter, the shape and contours of any future Palestinian state.
Clearly, this is not an original point of view. Literally thousands of
scholars and pundits who have added their voice to the debate on the
Arab-Israeli conflict have identified the refugee question as central to
any potential solution. In this paper, I will briefly discuss the refugee
population and its legal status in the various host nations, as a
backdrop to the debate of the status of the Palestinian refugees. As
this paper aims to consider the use of international law, I will then
focus on the issue of the laws that apply in this case and consider
formulas for their implementation. At the outset, I need to issue two
disclaimers. First, I beg the indulgence of the participants in this
conference if much of what I discuss is well known to all. I believe
that a focus on a general background will enable a discussion of the
more pertinent and abstract issues of international law and its
implementation. Second, while I suppose I have promised to discuss
implementation, I think I need to be frank as to what I intend to do.
My goal is not to propose a solution, as several scholars have done,
simply because I think that such a step is entirely premature in this
case. Implementing international law in the case of Palestinian
refugees - by which I essentially mean realizing their right of return
and/or compensation as envisioned by U.N. General Assembly
Resolution 194 of 1948 - demands recourse to methods that are not as
simple as and are far more numerous than identifying an adequate
judicial forum, filing a complaint, and litigating the matter. In the
* Mr. Said is an Assistant Federal Public Defender and author of several studies on
the legal status of Palestinian refugees.
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end, resolving the conflict entails a great deal more than crafting
winning legal arguments for use in an empowered and adequate
international judicial forum (that in and of itself may never exist).
Currently, out of an original number of 770,000, there are some
4.14 million refugees from Palestine registered with the United
Nations: 1,740,170 in Jordan, 922,674 in the Gaza Strip, 665,246 in the
West Bank, 413,827 in Syria and 394,532 in Lebanon, according to the
most recent figures.' An additional 1.3 million Palestinian refugees
are not registered with the United Nations.
With respect to the legal status of Palestinian refugees, each
region presents a different picture. Refugees in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip enjoy the same legal rights as do the non-refugee
Palestinian population, except that refugees in the West Bank are
eligible for Jordanian passports for travel purposes only and do not
confer Jordanian citizenship.2 Thus, the passport holder can be
refused entry by Jordan as by any other country in the world under
each nation's immigration laws and policies. Refugees in both the
West Bank and Gaza Strip are also eligible for passports issued by the
Palestinian Authority (PA), but are permitted to travel on it only if
Israel has granted permission, since Israel retained control over the
borders of the West Bank and Gaza under the Oslo Accords.3 West
Bank refugees traveling on a PA passport may also lose the right to
Jordanian citizenship-a policy adopted by Jordan in 1995.' For
everyday purposes, West Bank and the Gaza Strip refugees hold
identity cards issued by the Palestinian Authority that must also
display the number of the holder's previous Israeli-issued identity
card.
Around 1.74 million registered refugees reside currently in
Jordan, a figure that represents some 42% of the Palestinian refugees
registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA)' In addition, there are another estimated 800,000
refugees who were displaced in 1967, when they fled the Israeli
1. United Nations, UNRWA in Figures - Figures as of 31 December 2003, at
<www.un.org/unrwa/publications/pdf/uif-dec03.pdf> (visited Sept. 26, 2004).
2. U.S. Committee for Refugees, Country Report: Jordan, at
<www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/mideast/Jordan.htm> (visited Sept. 26, 2004).
3. Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Sept. 28, 1995, 36 I.L.M. 551, 565.
4. Id.
5. UNRWA in Figures - Figures as of 31 December 2003, supra note 1.
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army's advance on the West Bank.6 Of the total figure, around
293,000 live in refugee camps, amounting to no more than 17% of the
total Palestinian refugee population of Jordan. The remaining 82%
live outside the camps. All Jordanian refugees whether living in or
outside camps enjoy the benefits of full Jordanian citizenship,
including the right to vote.8 However, it is well established that
Palestinians still suffer from discrimination, especially in employment
in the public sector and representation in government.9 In addition,
some 150,000 refugees who made their way to Jordan following the
1967 war from the Gaza Strip do not enjoy full citizenship and cannot
vote or hold jobs in the public sector. ° These Gaza Strip refugees are
eligible to travel on Jordanian passports that are only valid for two
years, as opposed to the standard five years.11 Were the Palestinian
refugees in Jordan covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention or the
1967 Protocol - which they are not because of the provision of
services to them by UNRWA - they would lose their designation as
"refugees" by virtue of accepting citizenship in Jordan.12 However,
the fact that refugees in Jordan become Jordanian citizens does not
terminate their refugee status under UNRWA regulations.3 As a
result, they remain entitled to return to the lands from which they
were driven and to receive compensation for their dispossession.
With respect to Syria, out of the nearly 414,000 Palestinian
refugees, around 120,000 currently live in UNRWA-recognized
refugee camps." In general, Palestinians enjoy many of the same
rights as Syrian citizens, although they are not eligible for Syrian
citizenship.5 They enjoy equal labor and employment rights,
enabling them to work and join trade unions." They can own more
6. Country Report: Jordan, supra note 2.
7. UNRWA in Figures - Figures as of 31 December 2003, supra note 1.
8. Country Report: Jordan, supra note 2.
9. JOSEPH MASSAD, COLONIAL EFFECTS: THE MAKING OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
IN JORDAN (2001).
10. Country Report: Jordan, supra note 2.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Wadie E. Said, Palestinian Refugees: Host Countries, Legal Status
and the Rights of Return, 21-2 REFUGE 89, 90 n.13-15 (2003).
13. Id.
14. UNRWA in Figures - Figures as of 31 December 2003, supra note 1.
15. U.S. Committee for Refugees, Country Report: Syria, at
<www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/mideast/Syria.htm> (visited Sept. 26, 2004).
16. Nabil Mahmoud as-Sahly, Development Indicators Among Palestinian
Refugees in Syria 1948-2000 in Profiles: Palestinian Refugees in SYRIA, 3
(Dec. 1999), available at <http://www.badil.org/al-Majdal/1999/4_12.htm> (visited
2005]
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than one business or commercial enterprise. 7 They are also allowed
to serve in the Syrian military. 8 Palestinians can move freely within
Syria and have no limitations as to where they can reside within the
country.'9 Palestinian refugees can leave and re-enter Syria on a
government-issued travel document or laissez-passer. 20 By way of
contrast, the 50,000 or so Palestinian refugees currently residing in
Egypt are not allowed to leave the country without first obtaining a
return visa, which is issued at the discretion of the Egyptian
authorities.2' Palestinians in Syria cannot own more than one home,
however, and cannot purchase arable land.22 Nor can they vote in
parliamentary or presidential elections or run as candidates for
political office.'
In Lebanon the situation of Palestinian refugees is the most
grave. Fifty-six percent of the total 394,000 Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon live in the twelve refugee camps run and recognized by
UNRWA. 4 Over 75,000 other refugees live in unrecognized camps or
temporary shelters, bringing the total percentage of refugees living in
camp-like dwellings to 75% of the refugee population.25 The
Department of Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees, an office within
the Lebanese Ministry of the Interior, is responsible for administering
the Palestinian presence in Lebanon.26 All births, deaths and
Sept. 26, 2004).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Abbas Shiblak, Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in
Arab Countries, 1 SHAML (DEC. 1998), available at
<www.shaml.org/publications/monos/monol.htm> (visited Sept. 26, 2004); see also
Oroub El Abed, The Palestinians in Egypt: An Investigation of Livelihoods and
Coping Strategies (Sept. 2003), available at
<www.aucegypt.edu/fmrs/Reports/EnglishReport.pdf> (visited Sept. 26, 2004) for a
discussion of the change in the status of Palestinians from being on par with Egyptian
nationals for purposes of work and residence in the Nasser era to a situation of
conditional residence and extremely restricted rights to employment from the post
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty up to the present day.
22. Mahmoud as-Sahly, supra note 16.
23. Id.
24. UNRWA in Figures - Figures as of 31 December2003, supra note 1.
25. Mahmoud Abbas, The Housing Situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon in
The Socio-economic Conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon, 10 J. REFUGEE STUD.
379, 380-81 (1997).
26. Al-Marsoum Al-Ishtirai' [Legislative Decree] No. 42 (1959) (Leb.);
Legislative Decree No. 927 (1959) (Leb.); see also Wadie E. Said, The Palestinians in
Lebanon: The Rights of the Victims of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process, 30
[Vol. 28: 3
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marriages must be registered with the Department, which also must
approve any changes in residence. 27 The Department decides whether
or not to issue travel documents for the refugees and must approve
financial aid transferred to them from abroad. 28 The Department
maintains a profile on each refugee and assesses for the Ministry the
security risk the refugee may pose.29
Palestinians are classified as foreigners in Lebanon and may not
work without a work permit, which is rarely granted except in a few,
limited, sectors.3°  The vast majority of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon can only work in UNRWA, the Palestinian Red Crescent
Society, NGOs or in unsteady, low-paying, dangerous and
unregulated work primarily in construction and seasonal agriculture.3
Palestinians are excluded from certain professions. To be admitted to
the Lebanese Bar or to obtain work in a government agency, a person
must have been a Lebanese citizen for at least 10 years.32 Even with a
work permit Palestinian refugees remain ineligible for social service
benefits, despite deductions made for such benefits from their pay.33
Nor may they join trade unions as full-fledged members or officers?'
Finally, in 2002 the Lebanese government passed a law decreeing that
Palestinians could not own real property. 5 In short, Lebanon is in
gross violation of its obligations under both the International
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV 315, 325-327 (1999) for a more detailed discussion of this
topic.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Law Pertaining to the Entry Into, Residence In and Exit From Lebanon, art.
1 at 2 (1962) (Leb.) (classifying Palestinian refugees as foreigners by omission);
Lebanese Law No. 87/25, art. 1§2, 6/18/1987; Decree No. 17561 Regulating Foreigner
Work, art. 11-14 at 22-23 (Leb.).
31. Hussein Shaaban, Unemployment and its Impact on Palestinian Refugees in
Lebanon in Socio-economic Conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon, supra note 25, at
385-86.
32. Souheil AL-Natour, awDa' ash-Sha'b al-Filastini fi Lubnan [The Predicament
of the Palestinian People in Lebanon] 125 (1993); Legislative Decree No. 112 (1959),
in 6 Majmu'at at-Tashri' al-Lubnani [Anthology of Lebanese Legislation] 1 (Hon.
Salim Abi-Nader ed., 1962).
33. Social Security Law, art. 9, T 4 in Qanun aD-Daman al-Ijtimai' wa Qanun
Tasheel al-Iskan fi Lubnan [The Social Security Law and the Housing Facilitation
Law in Lebanon] 13-14 (compiled and edited by Iskandar Saqr).
34. Qanun al-Amal al-Lubnani [Lebanese Labor Law], arts. 91, 92, reprinted in 4
Majmua'at at-Tashri' al-Lubnani 1 (Hon. Salim Abi-Nader ed., 1962).
35. U.S. Committee for Refugees, Country Report: Lebanon, at
<www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/mideast/Lebanon.htm> (visited Sept. 26, 2004)
[hereinafter Lebanon Country Report].
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, each of which guarantees the right of work, the right
to form and join trade unions and the right to receive social services
36and benefits on the same terms as the countries' citizens.
The legal situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
explains in part why an estimated 80% live in poverty.37 Other factors
include the elimination of the Gulf countries as a source of potential
employment, as a result of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) siding with Iraq, and, ironically, the PLO cessation of most
forms of aid to Jordanian refugees following the signing of the Oslo
Accords in September 1993.38 In this connection, the high-ranking
Palestinian Authority Minister Nabil Shaath remarked in March 1995
that the Palestinians in Lebanon should be considered the
responsibility of UNRWA, which has concentrated its aid on the
West Bank and Gaza." The rise in poverty has also created a health
crisis, as Palestinians are not allowed access to Lebanese government
hospitals and other health services. ' Official and unofficial hostility
toward Palestinians run high in Lebanon, with one minister referring
to them in 1995 as "human waste."'
Turning to the issue of international law and the refugee
question, the centerpiece of the international dialogue on the fate of
the refugees is U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194(111), which
has enshrined the principle of the right of return. It reads in pertinent
part:
[T]he refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in
peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at
the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should
36. See Said, supra note 26 at n.4; see also Lebanon Country Report at 329-341for
a lengthier discussion of Lebanon's dereliction of its duties to Palestinian refugees
under international law.
37. See Lebanon Country Report at 387.
38. ROSEMARY SAYIGH, Too MANY ENEMIES: THE PALESTINIAN EXPERIENCE IN
LEBANON 326 (1994).
39. Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future,
25 J. PALESTINE STUD. 37, 41 (1995) ("At UNRWA's emergency meeting in Amman
last March [1995], PA delegate Nabil Shaath stated emphatically that Palestinians in
Lebanon were not the PA's responsibility but UNRWA's").
40. Id. at 44; see also Yves Besson, UNRWA and its Role in Lebanon, 10 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 335,339 (1997).
41. Fida Nasrallah, Lebanese Perceptions of the Palestinians in Lebanon: Case
Studies, 10 J. REFUGEE STUD. 349, 356 (1997).
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be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and
for the loss of or damage to property which, under the
principles of international law or in equity, should be made
good by the Governments or authorities responsible. 2
The main opposition to the idea that Resolution 194, which has
been reaffirmed every year since its passage, confers a right of return
on the Palestinian refugees is that, as a General Assembly resolution,
it cannot constitute binding international law. While, if taken at face
value, this point has validity, it is not at all such a clear-cut issue.
Initially, it should be noted that Israel's admission into the United
Nations in General Assembly Resolution 273 was conditioned upon
its full implementation of the provisions of Resolution 194.43 In The
Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order, the late W.
Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison explain that one of the
functions of the General Assembly is "as an instrument to express
consensus on major international legal issues by majorities
substantially in excess of the two-thirds vote required by the [U.N.]
Charter for important questions." 4 This is a "practice... particularly
evident in General Assembly resolutions concerning Palestine, Israel,
and the Middle East., 45 Another objection stems from the fact that
the phrase "should be permitted" in Resolution 194 does not clearly
establish a right. This point is easily refuted by the fact that later
resolutions reaffirm "the inalienable right of the Palestinians to
return to their homes and property from which they have been
displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return." 46 Here, it is
important to note that at the time Resolution 194 was passed, the
notion of the right of return had been enshrined by customary
international law, which by its nature is binding. 7 Finally, with
respect to the argument that a General Assembly resolution cannot
create binding international law, it seems disingenuous at best for
42. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 24, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
43. G.A. Res. 273(111), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 18, U.N. Doc. A/900 (1949).
44. W. THOMAS & SALLY V. MALLISON, THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 150-51 (1986).
45. Id.
46. G.A. Res. 3236, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
47. G. J. Boling, The 1948 Palestinian Refugees and the Individual Right of
Return: An International Law Analysis, at 10-14, 48 (2001), (BADIL Resource Center
for
Residency and Refugee Rights, Bethlehem, Palestine), available at
<www.badil.org/Publications/Legal-Papers/RoR48.pdf>.
2005]
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Israel, which derived its legitimacy as a state and subsequently was
admitted to the United Nations through resolutions of the General
Assembly, to now make such a contention.
International law has clearly articulated the principle of a right of
return in all the major instruments that speak to this issue. For
example, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 states that
"[i]ndividual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of
protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the
Occupying power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are
prohibited, regardless of their motive." 8 The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone has the right to leave any
country, including his own, and return to his own country," and that
"[n]o one should be arbitrarily deprived of his own property." 9
Finally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) declares: "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right
to enter his own country. '
Israel and those legal analysts who support its position have
seized on the fact that Israel is not the Palestinians' "country" and
hence, they have no right of return to it. Professor John Quigley has
addressed this argument comprehensively, most recently in a 2003 law
review article, noting that "[w]hen a state experiences a change in
sovereignty, the state is still obligated to allow admission to nationals
who would have been entitled to admission had there been no change
in sovereignty." 1 Further, he remarks that an individual acquires the
nationality of a successor state in situations where a denial of
nationality would result in statelessness.52 With respect to the
position that international law, as embodied in the ICCPR, did not
envision a mass return of refugees in the Palestinian context, but
rather articulates an individual right, Professor Quigley rationally
notes that there can be no numerical cap on the exercise of individual
rights, and that "[i]f the argument against the right of return for
persons displaced en masse were allowed to succeed, then the
48. Geneva Convention Relation to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
49. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, arts. 13(2), 17(2), G.A. Res.
217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 74 (1948), available at
<www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/resins.htm>.
50. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966).
51. John B. Quigley, Repatriation of Displaced Palestinians as a Legal Right, 8
NEXUS 17, 19 (2003).
52. Id.
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argument in favor of right of return for the individual would also have
to fail."53
While there are other aspects of international law that pertain to
the right of return, it should be somewhat clear that the issue of the
applicability of the right of return for Palestinian refugees has been
recognized in international law. The various counter-arguments
range from legally questionable challenges to technicalities in the
language of international agreements, written essentially for a world
order dominated by the rights of states, and impermissible arguments
based on the need for some sort of ethno-religious supremacy.
Perhaps it is a strain to say that objections to the right of return in
substance are on the same shaky legal ground as Israel's "missing
reversioner" theory on why the Fourth Geneva Convention does not
apply to the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. "' In my opinion,
however, I believe that Israel's objection to the right of return, like
the "missing reversioner" theory, is incorrect from any moral or
universalist reading of international law.5 Essentially, what I mean is
that Israel seems to possess a robust capacity for creating and
vigorously arguing objections to international law, whether in the
context of refugees or its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza,
even when those objections are grounded in a dubious legal basis.
While these counter-arguments can be debunked from a legal and
moral point of view, they have found traction in the West and certain
sectors of the elite in the Arab world. Indeed, while many pundits in
the United States recently decried President Bush's support for the
Sharonian position that there will be no right of return to those areas
now inside Israel, they did so from the point of view of criticizing the
president's presumed prejudging of the outcome of the so-called final
status issues, invoking positions that were well-known to and agreed
upon by all but nonetheless deemed to be interfering with a future
negotiation process. 6 Of course, Israel could not be expected to take
in large numbers of Arab refugees, a position branded unrealistic,
and, in any event, several of the commentators actually noted that
many in the Arab world did not even expect such a resolution of the
53. Id.
54. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 94-97 (2003).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Walter Russell Mead, Why They Hate Us, Really, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2004, at A23; Dennis Ross, Bush Didn't Foreclose on the Palestinians, NEWSDAY,
Apr. 21, 2004, at A44.
2005]
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Palestinian refugee question. 7 Incidentally, what was striking was the
lack of a discussion about the need for Israel to somehow atone for
the fact that it created the refugee population, for which it is
responsible under international law. Further noteworthy is that it
seems that many of the theories advanced in opposition to a right of
return were posited well before the conclusions of the "revisionist"
historians in Israel and the Arab world on the cause of the refugees'
flight gained widespread credence in academia. Legal analysts
arguing against a right of return in international law operate from a
much weaker factual basis than before when faced with now-
discredited theories that the refugees fled in 1948 of their own free
will and/or in response to the orders of the invading Arab armies.
I believe that the first step in implementing international law
with respect to the Palestinian refugees lies in determining what it is
they want for themselves and finding ways to empower them to work
toward such a goal. For example, are the refugees willing to live in a
bi-national state with Israelis as their neighbors? Or do they envision
some sort of reconfigured partition plan? While I wish in no way to
denigrate the important work done by many scholars and activists on
the issue of researching what would comprise adequate solutions and
compensation schemes for the refugees and comparing and
contrasting similar schemes in other contexts, I believe that such an
analysis is premature at this stage, given the undeveloped and
unexplored nature of what it is that Palestinian refugees want. Only
once the refugees themselves define, within the Palestinian national
movement, or otherwise, what rights and positions they seek and
clearly demand them with a unified voice, can they begin to think
about how to vindicate those rights. I should be clear here: the
refugees themselves need to come up with a plan of implementing the
right of return that they are willing to accept. Such a campaign will
empower the refugees, and all Palestinians, to successfully tackle the
issue of implementing the right. Also, a plan to enable recognition
and implementation of the right of return will also serve the purpose
of allowing the refugees to decide for themselves what type of
implementation works best for them, as opposed to having piecemeal
and wholly unsatisfying solutions foisted upon them.
Such a view is not as simple as it seems. In the absence of an
open and organized campaign, gauging refugee attitudes has emerged
as a politically charged activity, and will continue to ignite
57. Id.
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controversy. For example, in July 2003, the Palestinian researcher
and pollster Khalil Shikaki issued the results of a poll he took
regarding five proposed options for a final resolution of the refugee
issue. 8 The options, only one of which involved a return to areas in
pre-1967 Israel, were those discussed in the last-ditch peace talks
conducted between Israel and the PA in January 2001 in Taba,
Egypt.59 The poll involved surveying the attitudes of equal groupings
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Jordan, and the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. Incredibly, out of the options presented to the poll
takers, the survey seemed to show that only 10% of Palestinian
refugees would opt to return to areas currently within the pre-1967
borders of the state of Israel.6° The results of the survey were met
with a bizarre sense of glee by certain commentators in the West and
Israel, who surmised that the right of return was really not so
important after all, and furious indignation by the refugees
themselves, some of whom attacked Shikaki's office in Ramallah
during a scheduled press conference that consequently never
58. Khalil Shikaki, Results of PSR Refugees' Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip,
Jordan and Lebanon on Refugees' Preference and Behavior in a Palestinian-Israeli
Permanent Refugee Agreement, PRESS RELEASE, (Palestinian Center for Policy and
Survey Research), July 18, 2003, available at
<www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html>.
59. The question was presented in the survey as follows:
We will now read you a proposed solution to the refugee problem that was
published in Palestinian papers in the light of the Taba negotiations in
January 2000. We will then ask you few questions:
The establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
and Israeli recognition of UN resolution 194 or the right of return. But the
two sides would agree on the return of a small number of refugees to Israel
in accordance with a timetable that extends for several years. Each refugee
family will be able to choose one of the following options:
1. Return to Israel in accordance with an annual quota and become an
Israeli citizen
2. Stay in the Palestinian state that will be established in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip and receive a fair compensation for the property taken over by
Israel and for other losses and suffering
3. Receive Palestinian citizenship and return to designated areas inside Israel
that would be swapped later on with Palestinian areas as part of a territorial
exchange and receive compensation
4. Receive fair compensation for the property, losses, and suffering and stay
in the host country receiving its citizenship or Palestinian citizenship
5. Receive fair compensation for the property, losses, and suffering and
immigrate to a European country or the US, Australia, or Canada and
obtain citizenship of that country or Palestinian citizenship.
60. Id.
20051
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
occurred.6'
Shikaki never actually released the poll, but rather offered a
press release that summarized the results with his own particular spin.
While the poll engendered much strong and well-reasoned criticism
from Palestinian commentators, I will not repeat such criticism here,
simply because the poll results serve as an example of how susceptible
refugee attitudes on the right of return have become to political
manipulation and ideological agendas. However, I will note that
despite generally low poll-taking standards in Palestine, which often
involves asking questions in a suggestive manner that guarantees pre-
determined answers,62 the press release made little sense. Consider
the following sentence from the Introduction:
Based on several previous surveys showing that the
overwhelming majority of the refugees (more than 95%)
insist on maintaining the "right of return" as a sacred right
that can never be given up, PSR surveys sought to find out
how refugees would behave once they have obtained that
right and how they would react under various likely
conditions and circumstances of the permanent settlement.
In my view, it is hard to fathom how a refugee who has "obtained"
the right of return would then "behave" and "react" to alternative
proposals forged from peace talks engineered specifically to
eviscerate that right.
Clearly, the main impediment to realizing a just resolution to the
refugees' predicament has been Israel's unwillingness to countenance
any solution that involves a right to return to those areas within the
pre-1967 borders of Israel, except in highly restrictive and limited
numbers subject to Israel's control. Nevertheless, any talk of
implementation must deal with the development of an unambiguous
Palestinian position on the right of return. Within Palestinian society,
it is widely assumed that the issue of the right of return is a sacred
right that cannot be compromised. There seems to be official and
popular support for such a sentiment. Indeed, at least one
commentator has noted that surveys or other attempts to gauge
attitudes toward the right of return are unnecessary, since return is an
61. REUTERS, Palestinians Riot to Stop Release of Survey (July 13, 2003),
available at <www.unitedjerusalem.org/index2.asp?id=321936&Date=7/14/03>.
62. Incidentally, my experience as a translator and editor at the Jerusalem Media
Communications Center (JMCC), a Palestinian NGO that frequently conducts polls
within the West Bank and Gaza, exposed me to the highly suspect and suggestive
manner of poll-taking I refer to above.
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inalienable right that cannot be derogated by popular opinion
63
surveys. Yet, when the discussion turns to implementation, the
refugee community needs to look beyond the presumption of the
right. In the absence of an international forum or tribunal capable of
implementing the right of return, the refugees themselves need to
articulate a strategy that they will follow and work towards goals that
will not be scrapped at the first sign of pressure from more powerful
actors. While I agree with the sentiment that the right of return is an
inalienable right - a point which finds strong support in international
law - its implementation will depend largely on a successful campaign
in the international community, as well as in Israel, to convince the
world that a) arguments of alleging demographic concerns are
outdated and an impermissible basis for denying the right, and b) a
return would involve a peaceful solution most probably rooted in a
bi-national state option.
Unfortunately, the level of discourse in the refugee community
can appear chaotic and distinctly un-nuanced, at least with respect to
debate in the Arab countries. For example, a June 28, 2003 airing of
the Al-Jazeera program "Hiwar Maftouh" (An Open Discussion)
entitled "Awlawiyat al-Laji'een al-Filastiniyyin" (Priorities of the
Palestinian Refugees), which featured an open discussion among
audiences of refugees in the Wihdat camp in Jordan and Jenin
refugee camp in the West Bank, revealed nothing but the same old
clich6s: affirming the right of return, liberating Palestine and
achieving victory. Despite the repeated entreaties of the host, the
refugees in the Wihdat camp refused to engage in a discussion of their
integration into Jordanian society, preferring instead to engage in
platitudes about how there is no difference between Jordanians and
Palestinians and that they are determined to return.6 The superficial
level of the dialogue indicates that the refugees themselves have been
so isolated and disempowered that they can no longer discuss their
feelings about the kind of future solution they would accept. This
may not be a universal problem, as a 2001 report from a joint British
parliamentary commission on the right of return shows.65  As
63. Salman Abu Sitta, Akthar min Ra'I, (AL-JAZEERA television broadcast, July
18, 2003), at <www.aljazeera.net/programs/opinions/articles/2003/7/7-22-1.htm>.
64. Hiwar Maftouh, (AL-JAZEERA television broadcast, Jun. 28, 2003), at
<www.ajazeera.net/programs/open-dialog/articles/2003/6/6-30-l.htm> (visited Sept.
26, 2004).
65. Richard Faulk, Preface to RIGHT OF RETURN: JOINT PARLIAMENTARY
MIDDLE EAST COUNCILS COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY - PALESTINIAN REFUGEES, at 8
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Professor Richard Falk notes in his preface to the report, through
talking with activists from and experts on the refugee community
across the Middle East, a strong uniformity of purpose and position
can be gleaned regarding the necessity of recognizing the right of
return.66 Translating these highly-nuanced, thoughtful, and forceful
views from informed activists and experts into a general level of
awareness on the importance of the right of return is certainly
possible, but it demands a systematic and well-organized campaign.
The Arab states, chiefly Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which have all
made strong statements on the right of return, could be the subject of
such a campaign. Allowing refugees to freely organize, travel and
speak out on their plight would enhance the probability of
implementing the right of return that would satisfy those states and
the refugees. This would thus insure that a lingering sense of
resentment and injustice does not continue beyond a Palestinian-
Israeli peace deal as currently envisioned.
Notwithstanding Israel's responsibility, the chaotic and
depressed state of affairs within the refugee community primarily falls
on the official Palestinian leadership. From the signing of the Oslo
Accords in 1993 and continuing through the subsequent "peace
process," the Palestinian Authority has consistently taken positions
that indicate a willingness to sacrifice the refugee issue for the sake of
the two-state solution. Initially, this willingness took the form of
statements. As I mentioned earlier, in 1995, Nabil Shaath, the current
PA foreign minister, was quoted as saying that the Palestinians in
Lebanon had become the responsibility of UNRWA, a sentiment that
reflects the risible level of material support the Palestinian Authority
sent to Lebanon. More importantly, the Palestinian Authority has
been willing to bargain away the right of return in exchange for its
dream of an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza.67 Even
commentators sympathetic to the Palestinian Authority's position in
the Camp David summit of July 2000 have remarked that the
Palestinians were willing to be flexible in creating solutions to resolve
the refugee issue, a position that evolved further in the Taba talks of
January 2001. 68 While there was agreement in principle about having
(Labour Middle East Council et al., 2001), available at
<www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPPIPRRN/Papers/returnbook.pdf>.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id. at 7.
68. Hussein Agha & Robert Malley, Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, 48 THE
N. Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS 13, Aug. 9, 2001, available at
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options for resolving the refugee issue, incidentally none of which
involved a right of return as imagined by international law, the talks
fell apart on the issues of borders, sovereignty and Jerusalem. The
election of Mahmoud Abbas as President of the Palestinian Authority
in January 2005, following the death of Yasser Arafat, has not, and
will not, affect this position, in my view.
Currently, the Palestinian Authority has remained quite open
about its willingness to give up the right of return despite the
extremely desperate situation in the region. This is in addition to the
strange eagerness and desire of the Palestinian Authority to negotiate
with an Israeli government that has systematically worked to ensure
its total impotence, domestically and internationally. Yasser Arafat,
in a 2002 New York Times Op-Ed article, called for a settlement of
the refugee issue that would eliminate Israel's demographic
concerns. 9 In a June 21, 2004 interview with the Israeli newspaper
Haaretz, Arafat made it clear that he agrees that Israel should remain
a Jewish state after a final peace agreement is reached. The Geneva
Accord, hammered out between former PA Minister of Culture
Yasser Abed Rabbo and former Israeli Minister of Justice Yossi
Beilin, affirms "the right of the Jewish people to statehood" and
contemplates any return of refugees to areas now within the pre-1967
Israeli borders as subject to Israel's "sovereign discretion.",7' As many
have remarked, such an agreement could not have come about
without the active support of PA President Yasser Arafat. It should
be noted also that at one stage in 2002, Arafat accepted the Clinton
plan for resolving the conflict, a proposal that envisioned severe
curtailment of the right of return. Therefore, it is safe to conclude
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380>.
69. Yasser Arafat, Op-Ed, The Palestinian Vision of Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2002, at D15.
70. See David Landau & Akiva Eldar, A Jewish state? 'Definitely', HAARETZ
INT'L, June 29, 2004, available at <www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/440540.html>. (In
this article, Arafat also notes that the refugee issue was not the cause of the failure of
the Camp David and Taba talks, and that parameters of a solution for the refugee
issue were within grasp, but that other issues caused the talks to fail.).
71. The Geneva Accord, Preamble and Article 7(4), Oct. 2003, available at
<www.fmep.org/documents/GenevaAccord.html>. Other Palestinian signatories
included members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and one acting PA minister.
72. In discussing the calculated willingness of the Palestinian leadership to give
up the right of return in negotiations with the Israelis, it should be noted that Khalil
Shikaki, the pollster mentioned above, served as an emissary of then PA Prime
Minister and current PA President Abu Mazen to secret negotiations with senior
staff members of the National Security Council in Washington during the summer of
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that the Palestinian Authority has prioritized the idea of a Palestinian
state over implementing the right of return.
On the other hand, it is difficult to square the PA's negotiating
position on this issue with other conflicting public proclamations,
which only serve to confuse the refugee population as to the position
of its leadership. Immediately following the April 14, 2004 press
conference at the White House, in which President Bush endorsed
Israel's position of no right of return for Palestinian refugees to areas
within Israel, Yasser Arafat declared that Palestinian refugees would
never give up their right of return.73 Even more explicit, on April 25,
2004, PLO executive committee member and former PA Interior
Minister, Hani al-Hassan, an Arafat loyalist, addressed a large
refugee demonstration in support of Arafat at Burj ash-Shamali camp
in southern Lebanon via telephone. He stated that "the right of
return will bring down Bush and Sharon," adding that Arafat "will
not die before entering Jerusalem with all the refugees from Lebanon
and the world., 74 Finally, on May 15, 2004, Youm an-Nakba (The
Day of the Catastrophe), Arafat repeated his commitment to the
right of return and stated that there can be no bargaining away of the
right. 75 This ambiguity regarding the right of return promises to sink
any Palestinian leadership that would try and bargain away the right
in such a cavalier manner. Outside elite Palestinian circles, I doubt
that the majority of Palestinians understand that the Palestinian
Authority has employed the refugee issue as a bargaining chip in
negotiations and not as an unshakable plank of its negotiating
position. Not to put too fine a point on it, or, for that matter, get too
personal, but I recall a conversation I had last spring with a friend of
mine, who is a refugee from Rafah in the Gaza Strip. In discussing
2003. The collusion of the pollster with a PA officialdom ready and willing to give up
the right of return in negotiations casts further doubt on the viability of the results.
See Sidney Blumenthal, Comment, Bush and Blair - the betrayal, THE GUARDIAN,
Nov. 14, 2003, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4797117-
103677,00.html>.
73. Arafat attacks Sharon's Gaza plan, BBC NEWS, Apr. 15, 2004, at
<news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middleeast/3627817.stm> (visited Sept. 26, 2004).
74. AI-Filastiniyyun fi Lubnan yataThaharun bi-kathafatin ta'yidan li-Arafat (The
Palestinians in Lebanon Demonstrate en Masse in Support of Arafat), AL-QUDS AL-
ARABI (April 26, 2004), available at
<www.alquds.co.uk:8080/archives/pdf/2004/04Apr/26AprMon/QudsO5.pdf>.
75. Maseerat fi youm an-nakba wa Arafat yushaddidu 'ala haqq al-awda
(Processions on the Day of the Catastrophe and Arafat Emphasizes the Right of
Return), AL-JAZEERA NET, (May 15, 2004), available at
<www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2004/5/5-15-12.htm>.
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the issue of the right of return, he indicated that the debate in the
mind of his family and other refugees is whether or not to accept a
right to return to those areas from which the refugees were driven in
Israel versus a demand that the refugees be allowed to return to their
actual homes. A well-developed and truly popular campaign on the
right of return is the best mechanism to hold the Palestinian
leadership accountable and to bring their negotiating position and
their rhetoric in line with the rights and aspirations of the refugees.76
As a method of generating support for the right of return in the
Palestinian conflict, attention should be paid to the fact that many
recent conflicts have seen the principle of voluntary repatriation
upheld time and time again, even in the face of massive displacement
and internecine strife. For example, Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace
Accords, which ended the conflict in Bosnia in late 1995, affirms that
"[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to
their homes of origin., 77 Further, Annex 7 states that the Bosnian
refugees "shall have the right to have restored to them property of
which they were deprived in the course of hostilities since 1991 and to
be compensated for any property that cannot be restored to them.,
78
In the context of the conflict in Kosovo, President Clinton stated that:
"The refugees belong in their own homes, in their own land., 79 He
added: "Our immediate goal is to provide relief; our long-term goal is
to give them their right to return."' Even in the United Nation's
proposed peace plan for Cyprus, the issue of a right of return was
never in doubt. What was being sought was the reunification of the
island republic, where both populations, Greek and Turkish, would
be equal citizens. The issue of return to specific properties and
compensation for dispossession was to be made the subject of an
entity entitled the Cyprus Property Board, which would handle all
76. I should note that more Palestinians are willing to be critical of private efforts
like the Geneva Accord, especially with respect to the issue of its weakness on
refugee rights. See, e.g., Siyasiyyun Filastiniyyun yuhadhdhiruna min al-mubadarat
al-munfarida (Palestinian Politicians Caution Against Individual Initiatives), AL-
JAZEERA NET (June 3, 2004), available at <www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2004/6/6-3-
13.htm>.
77. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dec.
14, 1995, Bosn.-Herz., annex 7, chapter 1, art. 1-1, 35 I.L.M. 75, available at
<www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayann7.html>.
78. Id.
79. CNN, Clinton makes appeal for Kosovar relief donations, at
<www.cnn.com/US/9904/05/us.refugees.02> (visited Sept. 26, 2004).
80. Id.
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claims.81 Finally, it is noteworthy that numerous peace accords over
the last 20 years, covering conflicts from Bosnia and Indochina to
Guatemala and El Salvador, have affirmed the property rights of
refugees and, thereby, their right of return.2
The Palestinian challenge is in many ways unique. A very
powerful state, Israel, denies the refugees the right of return based on
demographic considerations and existential fears of a Jewish state
being swallowed up by Arabs. The Palestinians, a fragmented and
dispersed people, without any strategic allies and resource-challenged
in all aspects of their struggle, cannot seem to work together to forge
a unified peace strategy, let alone work on enacting that strategy. In
the case of the conflicts in the Balkans, the United States saw an
opportunity to advance its dominance over the United Nations in the
European context through NATO under the guise of advancing the
notion of humanitarian interventions. Of course, the United States'
action came well after many atrocities had been committed in Bosnia,
and actually precipitated a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo, specifically
with respect to the refugees. In Cyprus, the proposed U.N. peace
agreement was deemed insufficient by the Republic of Cyprus, since
it seemed to reward Turkish military aggression and subsequent
occupation of a large part of the island. The Greek Cypriots
overwhelmingly rejected the plan without any real penalty, since they
knew that their nation was scheduled to become part of the European
Union, whether or not the island was reunified. An economic and
diplomatic bonanza was guaranteed them and there was no need to
acquiesce in what they believed to be an abrogation of their rights,
rightly or wrongly. Needless to say, the Palestinians cannot boast of
any such strategic advantages or fortuitous alignments with
superpowers.
On a final note, what is really behind Israel's denial of the right
of return is, as is well known to all, a fear of a change in its
demographic makeup. In this stance, there is both ethnic bias and an
existential fear of the notion of the Jewish state disappearing. Leaving
to one side the paradox that in the Jewish state of Israel over 20% of
its citizens are non-Jews, demographic concerns are entirely
premature at this stage, given that Israel shows no signs of accepting
81. The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, annex 7, art. 2,
available at <www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan-Plan-April2004.pdf>.
82. Susan Akram, Palestinian Refugees and Their Legal Status: Rights, Politics,
and Implications for a Just Solution, 31 JOURNAL OF PALESTINIAN STUDIES 3 at pp.
36-51 (Spring 2002).
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the right of return and that the exact number of refugees wanting to
return is unknown at this time. Regardless, the nature and universal
acceptance of the principle of the right of return should trump any
demographic considerations, especially those rooted in racial
discrimination and nothing more. In any event, what exempts Israel
from being held accountable under international legal norms and
standards for a refugee population it clearly created? As the
Mallisons famously wrote, "[t]he United Nations is under no more of
a legal obligation to maintain Zionism in Israel than it is to maintain
apartheid in South Africa." With respect to the anti-Arab bias
behind Israel's invocation of an ethnically pure Jewish state, suffice it
to note that the process of encouraging immigration from the former
Soviet Union has resulted in at least 200,000 - and possibly as many
as 400,000 - non-Jews from that region settling in Israel.83 While
these facts are powerful in and of themselves, a campaign for refugee
rights will only be successful if it can convince Israelis to live together
with them in peace, a task many Palestinians probably feel should not
be their responsibility in their capacity as victims in the conflict.
While I would not argue that it is their responsibility per se, in
alleviating existential Israeli fears about extinction, it would certainly
allow Palestinians to truly articulate a remarkable vision of peace and
a shared future that could put to shame arguments of demography.
83. Uri Avnery, Israel: the Jewish Demographic State, COUNTERPUNCH (Oct. 11,
2002), at <www.counterpunch.org/avneryl0ll.html>.
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